In recent years, there has been considerable controversy over whether not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit (FP) (Gray 1986) , better access in NFP hospitals (Gray 1986; Lee and Weisbrod 1977) , more charity care in NFP hospitals (Gray 1986; Lewin, Eckels, and Miller 1988) , and higher prices and profits in FP
hospitals (Renn et al. 1985) . Others have concluded that NFP hospitals are less efficient than FP hospitals after adjustment for tax subsidies (Herzlinger and Krasker 1987) . Finally, some have reported that no important differences exist between the two ownership types (Sloan and Vraciu 1983 ).
This article is based on the argument that, whatever the research shows about differences in the behavior of FP and NFP hospitals, NFP hospitals-in order to justify the special treatment they receive, including exemption from income and property taxes and the right to issue tax-exempt bonds-ought to behave in a manner fundamentally different from FP hospitals. Several states and localities are, in effect, taking this normative position by challenging the traditional privileges enjoyed by NFP hospitals in situations where the hospitals are not demonstrating a sufficient social orientation in their behavior (Baldwin 1987; Nauert et al. 1988 ).
At the outset, one might ask whether it is reasonable to expect NFP hospitals to behave in a more socially oriented manner than FP hospitals under increasingly constrained environmental circumstances. It has been suggested that they are adopting and will have to continue to adopt the behavior of FP hospitals, sacrificing nonfinancial goals to assure financial viability (Jones, DuVal, and Lesparre 1987) . The premise of this article is that, in spite of economic pressures, managers of NFP hospitals must ensure that significant differences continue to exist in the behavior of NFP hospitals as compared to FP hospitals and, further, that the communities these hospitals serve are clearly and accurately informed of the differences. Abandonment of nonfinancial objectives could well be a major step in the demise of the not-for-profit hospital sector (Foster 1987) . To fulfill their roles with accountability to the communities they serve, and to justify their special treatment, managers of NFP hospitals must use decision criteria somewhat different from those of FP hospitals (Anthony and Herzlinger 1975) .
This study addresses one decision that is important for all firms, the capital expenditure (investment) decision. This decision is especially critical to the NFP institution's ability to meet both its service and its financial objectives and, indeed, to its very survival in this era of restrictive prospective payment and increasing competition and rivalry. The literature on capital expenditure decision making for not-for-profit health care institutions has not reached a consensus on how these decisions should be made. As this article will show, differences exist both in the theoretical bases for decision criteria and in the technical decision tools to employ.
We propose a normative decision model that explicitly recognizes 
THE ROLE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS
In contrast to the purpose of for-profit firms, which is to maximize the wealth of owners, the establishment of not-for-profit firms has often been explained by certain characteristics of the output of the firm. Specifically, characteristics of the output necessitate the establishment of nonprofit firms to remedy government or contract failure.
Weisbrod (1977, 1988) (Weisbrod 1988 Silvers and Kauer (1986) and Hansmann (1980 Hansmann ( , 1987 Berman and Weeks (1982) and Herkimer (1978) Long's (1982a, b) Planning begins by determining the magnitude of desired commercial and social activities of the firm in the future and projecting the necessary set of assets to carry out these activities. Determination of the mix of social and commercial activities will depend on the overall mission of the hospital and, as discussed later, on the sources of financing available for these activities. The change in assets between the current and projected balance sheets must be financed with a debt/equity mix that results in the target capital structure. The principal determinant of the feasibility of the long-range financial plan is the ability of the hospital to generate sufficient equity to support the desired assets while holding to the target financing ratio.
For planning purposes, the annual percentage change in the dollar value of equity from operating and nonoperating sources is the minimum return on equity (profit rate) required to create the retained earnings necessary to finance the new assets. Along with the cost of debt financing, it determines the discount rate to use in the capital expenditure decision, as described later.
The profit rate achievable is affected by the market power of the firm. If the NFP hospital possesses little market power, the target return on equity may have to be revised downward. Or, if projects cannot generate the required return on equity, the firm may have to adjust its asset expansion plans downward. Financial planning is always an iterative process. It may be necessary to revise programs, goals, or the target capital structure if the required profit rate is not feasible due to product market conditions.
The long-range financial plan is related to the adoption of individual projects in two specific ways: (1) it provides a framework within which to evaluate specific projects by explicitly stating the social and commercial missions of the hospital; and (2) it reflects the evaluations of specific projects by showing which ones the hospital intends to undertake. In this sense, there is an iterative process between project assessment and long-range financial plan development. Desired projects determine the ideal asset structure. The returns on these desired projects, and the availability of sources of financing, determine the feasibility of the projects and therefore of the ideal asset structure.
A METHODOLOGY FOR THE EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC PROJECTS
In this section, a methodology for evaluating specific projects is presented. Like the approaches proposed by Long (1976 Long ( , 1982a , and Conrad (1984) , and the model implied by Silvers and Kauer (1986) , it is based on the wealth-maximizing net present value (NPV) criterion recommended by financial economists for for-profit commercial enterprises. However, the methodology also draws on the theory of the notfor-profit firm, specifically the mixed social and commercial nature of the NFP hospital, and formalizes the two roles in investment decision making. In the model, both the commercial (cash) and social value created by the NFP hospital are quantified. Investment models proposed previously by other authors have incorporated this dual nature only informally and qualitatively (Berman and Weeks 1982; Herkimer 1978), or have not shown the effect of the roles on the components of the model in detail (Long 1976 (Long , 1982a (Long , 1982b Conrad 1984 (Silvers and Kauer 1986; Conrad 1984 Conrad , 1986 Pauly 1986 When this equity is used to generate cash flows, a commercial purpose rather than the social purpose for which the equity was initially contributed, the firm must return the opportunity cost of those funds. Donors must be assured that the initial donation will grow at least at such a rate that its ability to purchase social dividends grows as fast as or more rapidly than the donor would be able to achieve through the next best alternative-the rate of return available in national financial markets after taxes [k&dquo;~ (1 -T)) (Silvers and Kauer 1986; Long 1976; Conrad 1986 ). To that we would add a risk adjustment as detailed in Wheeler and Smith (1988) .
This return must be earned whether the source of equity is donations or retained earnings. Retained earnings can be likened to capital appreciation in the standard investment model. The amount added to retained earnings in a given year is higher to the extent that dividends are not paid in that year. The required return each period in that model is based on the appreciated value of the investment. Thus, the tax-adjusted market-required rate of return is appropriately applied also to retained earnings.14 The equity growth rate specified by the hospital's long-range plan may exceed the tax-adjusted market return rate in some instances. If so, this planning-generated required rate of return should be used for ke instead of the market return. However, it is critical to note that this rate may be infeasible unless the NFP firm is very efficient, is subsidized by a governmental unit, or has some monopoly power. If these conditions do not exist, the long-range plan may have to be revised to a lower growth rate. In other words, the market evaluation of the firm is that it should not grow at its planned rate.
Social Discount Rate (ks)
The social discount rate is the equivalent of return on equity in the for-profit firm except that the supplier of equity capital to the NFP firm expects in-kind dividends in the form of social outputs in perpetuity.15 The dividends generated over the life of a project by the NFP hospital must be discounted to the present time to show their value in today's dollars, which is the amount that donors would be willing to pay to receive them. There is a well-developed literature on the appropriate discount rate to use in evaluating social programs, dating back at least to Marglin (1963) and Baumol (1968) . This literature develops the debate over whether the discount rate for social programs is different from the discount rate for private investment decision making. The context of the private NFP hospital is characterized by private financing of public goods, so that the issue of the appropriate social discount rate is perhaps even more complex than in the situation of public financing of a public good. The issue can be satisfactorily resolved by employing the arbitrage argument articulated by Silvers and Kauer (1986) , Long (1976) , and Conrad (1986) . If the NFP hospital does not return dividends at a rate at least equal to the tax-and risk-adjusted return on the market portfolio, donors are better off investing their dollars in the market portfolio and using the proceeds to purchase social goods directly. Pauly (1987b) (commercial) value. As with the commercial projects, if these projects contribute non-negative NPVs to the firm, they should be adopted. However, some of these projects will generate negative NPVs, especially because social output expenditures are cash outflows. In these cases, there are two further criteria for adoption.
First, if the social value of the project exceeds the negative NPV, or cash cost, the project is a candidate for adoption. In this case, the project is desirable because the aggregate value created is positive; that is, the cost in value to the firm is less than the benefit in value given to the community in dividends. Projects that generate less social value than the net present cash cost to the firm should be rejected. They use up more value in the firm than they provide in value to the community. Note that if ke is increased to reflect growth plans that exceed the market rate of return, fewer commercial and social projects will be accepted because fewer projects will satisfy the higher rate of return criterion.
The second criterion is shown in Equation 3 ; the constraint imposed on the adoption of &dquo;worthwhile&dquo; negative NPV projects is that the aggregate net present value of all projects adopted in a single period must be equal to zero. Thus, the adoption of any negative NPV project is dependent upon the adoption of positive NPV projects during the same planning period; that is, the firm will be able to adopt negative NPV projects while achieving its target financing structure only if sufficient excess cash is generated by positve NPV projects. Failure to adhere to this constraint will mean that the firm will be financing community dividends through sacrificing its ability to produce services (and dividends) in the future.
An exception may occur when the NFP hospital knowingly approves a partially liquidating dividend (Long 1982a, b) . When this occurs, donors receive a return of their initial investment, as well as dividends, in the form of in-kind services. Some part of the initial investment is returned in the sense that the equity in the firm is reduced consciously by the decision to produce additional social outputs.
The constraint that the total NPV of all of the adopted projects equals zero agrees with Long's (1976) Further, it will harm the retention of these benefits to claim that the benefits of NFP hospitals cannot be quantified (Jones, DuVal, and Lesparre 1987) A corollary to this argument is that if the NFP hospitals behave like for-profits in their capital expenditure decision making in order to improve financial performance, the same result will follow. By reducing the social benefits they provide to society, NFPs will face the loss of favorable tax treatment, as perhaps they should. It is also likely that the supply of equity financing would diminish . The challenge to nonprofit health care providers now and in the future will be to achieve both their financial and nonfinancial objectives.
9. Long (1976) (Long 1982a, b) in the sense that they consciously adopt projects which, taken together, result in negative NPV. Some donors give to NFP firms with the expectation that these firms will pay self-liquidating dividends.
